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The Atlanta Campaign
and Kennesaw Mountain
National Battlefield Park, Georgia
A Federal battery engaged in drill, using a 20-pourider Parrott gun,
the most effective type of ordnance employed during the Atlanta
Campaign. Wartime photograph. (Signal Corps, U. S. Army.)
THE COVER
The cover is a reproduction of a wartime sketch
illustrating the Confederates preparing for the
defense of Kennesaw Mountain. In order to
mount batteries on the crest of the mountain it was
necessary, due to the steepness of the slope, to pull
the guns by hand. This type of work was not
unusual for both armies during the Atlanta Cam-
paign, which in many places was fought over
rugged terrain. Reproduction of this sketch is by
courtesy and permission of the U. S. Army Signal
Corps.
Contents
Page
The Eve of the Atlanta Campaign 3
Terrain and Factors Affecting the Atlanta
Campaign 3
The Atlanta Campaign 5
Ringgold Gap 5
Rocky Face Ridge 5
Resaca 6
Cassville 6
New Hope Church 7
Battle of Kennesaw Mountain 9
Close of the Atlanta Campaign 11
Andrews' Raid 13
Chickamauga and Chattanooga National
Military Park 15
Atlanta Campaign National Marker Sites . 1 5
Kennesaw Mountain National Battlefield
Park 15
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
Harold L. Ickes, Secretary
NATIONAL PARK SERVICE - Newton B. Drury, Director
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, Washington, D. C ... Price 10 cents
The Atlanta Campaign and Kennesaw
Mountain National Battlefield Park
"Brothers of a common stock, of equal courage
and tenacity, animated by convictions which they
passionately held, they did on both sides all that
it was possible for soldiers to do, fighting their way
to a mutual respect which is the solid foundation
for a renewal of more than the old regard and
affection." Thus wrote General Cox, a participant
in the War between the States, of the men who
engaged in the Atlanta Campaign.
The Eve of the Atlanta Campaign
During the summer of 1863 heavy blows had fallen
on Confederate hopes. Grant captured Vicksburg
on July 4, and the whole length of the Mississippi
River passed under Federal control. Food supplies
and reinforcements furnished the Confederates in
the main theatre of war east of the river were there-
after cut off. On this same July 4, Lee was in full
retreat after the crucial Battle of Gettysburg, which
ended the last Confederate invasion of the North.
The war in the West now centered around the
Federal effort to control Chattanooga, which, after
severe setbacks, was successful. In the Battle of
Chickamauga, fought a short distance south of
Chattanooga, on September 19-20, the Federal
Army was defeated. It was forced to retreat hur-
riedly to Chattanooga where it was almost sur-
rounded on the east and south by Confederates who
occupied Missionary Ridge, Lookout Mountain,
and the Chattanooga Valley. All but the most
circuitous Federal lines of supply, based on Nash-
ville, were interrupted, and the besieged army was
soon in dire straits. Starvation threatened until
reinforcements arrived and an effective supply line
was established. New leaders were sent to assume
command of the Federal Army — Grant, Sherman,
Sheridan, and Hooker — and in hard fighting,
November 23-25, the Confederates were driven
from Lookout Mountain and Missionary Ridge
and forced back from Chattanooga.
The Federal forces were now in possession of a
strategically strong base, from which they effective-
ly could disrupt industry and communications in
the very heart of the Confederacy. A successful
invasion of Georgia would not only deprive the
South of a rich source of food and ordnance, but
would lower both the military and the civilian
morale, and remove the last possibility of European
states recognizing the Confederacy.
By May 1, 1864, Gen. William Tecumseh Sher-
man had assembled at Chattanooga approximately
100,000 men, well equipped, with 254 guns. Op-
posing him at Dalton, Ga., 34 miles distant, was
Gen. Joseph E. Johnston with about 50,000 men,
only fairly well equipped, with 187 guns. Soon
after the campaign started, Johnston's forces were
increased to about 60,000 men. The Confederates
were less abundantly supplied with ammunition
than were the Federals. Owing to the compara-
tive size of the armies, Johnston was on the defen-
sive, but fighting over terrain well adapted for defen-
sive tactics in territory friendly to the Confederacy.
Terrain and Factors Affecting the
Atlanta Campaign
The Federal Army was based on Chattanooga,
and the Confederate Army on Dalton, Ga., during
the winter of 1863-64. Atlanta, 120 miles from
Chattanooga, and 85 miles from Dalton, was
Johnston's base for supplies. This city, full of
machine shops, foundries, and arsenals, after
Johnston's army, was Sherman's main objective.
Its defense was the crucial task of the opposing
Confederate force. Grant's instructions to Sher-
man in the spring of 1864 directed him "to move
against Johnston's army, to break it up, and to get
into the interior of the enemy's country as far as
you can, inflicting all the damage you can against
their resources ..." Atlanta, a large town for
the time, was situated at the juncture of several
William Tecumseh Sherman, commander of the Federal Jorces in the
Atlanta Campaign, was one oj the ablest northern generals developed
by the war. {Signal Corps, U. S. Army.)
Strategic railroads. The Western and Atlantic
Railroad, running from Atlanta through Dalton to
Chattanooga, was the line of communication of
both armies; one reaching Richmond, Va., from
Atlanta by way of Danville, was a supply line be-
tween the Confederate States and the line of com-
munication between Johnston and Lee; another
ran from Atlanta through the heart of Georgia to
the coast at Savannah; and still another connected
Atlanta with Montgomery, Ala.
Between Chattanooga and Atlanta the country
was generally wooded, and, except the area be-
tween the Oostanaula and the Etowah Rivers, was
rugged and hilly. In front of Dalton a ridge about
30 miles long ran in a north-south direction and
could be crossed by an army in only two places, at
Mill Creek Gap where the railway passed through
it, and at Snake Creek Gap, 14 miles farther south.
In front of Marietta were Brush Mountain,
Kennesaw Mountain, Lost Mountain, and Pine
Mountain, and other rugged hiUs. Interposing
their courses across the theatre of action from
Dalton to Atlanta were the Oostanaula, the
Etowah, and the Chattahoochee Rivers. All the
roads were of the poorest kind.
Sherman described the Atlanta Campaign in
these words: "We were generally in a wooded
country, and, though our lines were deployed
according to tactics, the men generally fought in
strong skirmish lines, taking advantage of the
shape of the ground, and of every cover. We were
generally the assailants, and in wooded and broken
countries the 'defensive' had a positive advantage
over us, for they were always ready, had cover, and
always knew the ground to their immediate front;
whereas we, their assailants, had to grope our way
over unknown ground, and generally found a
cleared field or prepared entanglements that held
us for a time under a close and withering fire.
Rarely did the opposing lines in compact order
come into actual contact, but when, as at Peach
Tree Creek and Atlanta, the lines did become
commingled, the men fought individually in every
possible style, more frequently with the musket
clubbed than with the bayonet."
Military critics considered the Atlanta Campaign
a model of military strategy, and they have found
little in it to criticize. One critic sums up the
campaign in these words: "Except in attacking the
Kennesaw Mountain on the 27th of June, the
character of Sherman's operations was, throughout,
the same. To protect his main line from a counter-
attack, he left a force intrenched across it. He
then reinforced his flanking wing to a strength
sufficient to cope with the whole army of the enemy,
and directed it by a circuit off the main line, upon
the Confederate rear. In every case the operation
was successful, obliging Johnston forthwith to
abandon his strongest positions, and to retreat."
Another critic comments: "It is rather curious to
note that Johnston made no effort to defend the
rivers across his line of retreat by taking positions
behind them; and that he appeared rather to
prefer having a river at his back, as at Resaca and
at the Chattahoochee. He was careful to provide
plenty of bridges for his retreat, and by destroying
them at the right time, he hindered the pursuit.
"Both hostile armies in this campaign made con-
stant use of fieldworks. It was only by means of
intrenching that Sherman was able to hold John-
ston with a small force in front, while he dispatched
the bulk of his command upon the wide turning-
movements."
Writing many years after the war. General
Sherman said of his adversary in the Atlanta
Campaign up to the Battle of Peach Tree Creek:
"No officer or soldier who ever served under me
will question the generalship of Joseph E.Johnston.
His retreats were timely, in good order, and he
left nothing behind."
The Atlanta Campaign was only one phase of a
gigantic plan of battle which it was hoped would
end the war. The line of battle may be said to
have extended from Fort Monroe in Virginia on
the Chesapeake Bay across northern Virginia to
the Rapidan River, hence curving southwestward
through West Virginia, eastern Tennessee, and
western North Carolina, northwest Georgia, and
the middle of Alabama to the Gulf of Mexico.
Grant's army facing Lee in northern Virginia
constituted the center, and Sherman's army at
Chattanooga, the right, of this long offensive line.
The might of the Federal Army was concentrated
under Grant and Sherman, just as that of the
Confederate Army was concentrated under Lee
and Johnston. The great offensive was planned
to open on May 4, in both Virginia and Georgia.
Sherman was to drive straight into the heart of
the South.
The Atlanta Campaign
RINGGOLD GAP
The Federal Army wintering in Chattanooga
had maintained an advance position at Ringgold
Gap which served to prevent surprise attacks. On
May 7, Sherman moved through this gap in the
initial phase of the Atlanta Campaign.
Ringgold Gap National Marker Site, south
of Ringgold, Ga., on United States Highway 41,
has for its primary purpose the orientation of the
traveler who is following Sherman's route. A
bronze relief map is mounted here illustrating the
terrain over which fighting occurred in 1864. The
locations of the major engagements of the Atlanta
Campaign are shown and a brief narrative of the
campaign is given.
ROCKY FACE RIDGE
As Sherman advanced from Ringgold Gap, he
found Confederates strongly intrenched on Rocky
Face Ridge north of Dalton. Realizing the
strength of this position, Sherman determined to
march around it and threaten the Confederate
line of communication, the Western and Atlantic
Joseph Eggleston Johnston was commander oj the Conjederate Army
of the Tennessee and the Army of Mississippi which opposed Sherman
during the Atlanta Campaign. He was the fourth ranking general
in the Confederate Army; a masterful tactician and a worthy
opponent for any enemy. Johnston was replaced by Hood before the
battles around Atlanta were fought. {Signal Corps, U. S. Army.)
Railroad. He believed that such a move would
force his opponents to retire in order to protect
vital communications to their rear, and that they
would have to offer battle under circumstances
more favorable to him. While a Federal column
was flanking the Rocky Face Ridge position, by
way of Snake Creek Gap, 14 miles to the right,
Sherman made several attempts to force a passage
over the ridge and through Mill Creek Gap in
order to divert Confederate attention from his
important flank movement.
The Federal maneuvers were efficiently executed,
and, as a result, the Confederates on May 12 aban-
doned Rocky Face Ridge, retiring to Resaca.
Rocky Face Ridge National Marker Site,
10.9 miles south of Ringgold, on United States
Highway 41, at Mill Creek Gap, is one of the
points where Sherman attempted to pass through
the ridge. The relief map displayed at this site
portrays the physical difficulties which confronted
the Federal Army and outlines the military action.
The visitor readily can appreciate the advantages
enjoyed by troops intrenched on such a command-
ing ridge and in the narrow gap over and through
which Sherman was attempting to pass. Confed-
erate fortifications are visible at many points along
Rocky Face Ridge.
RESACA
As Sherman approached Resaca he found the
Confederates intrenched on a semicircle of hills
about the town with the Oostanaula River to
their rear. The Federal troops assaulted at several
points along the Confederate line.
While the Federal attacks were attended with
heavy losses, they enabled Sherman to secure
excellent artillery positions which commanded the
railroad crossing of the Oostanaula River and
exposed the Confederates to serious danger. At
the same time a Federal column was crossing the
Oostanaula River below Resaca at Lay's Ferry to
threaten the Confederate line of communications.
The Federal bombardment of the bridges and
the flanking movement across the river forced the
Confederates to retire, leaving Sherman in posses-
sion of Georgia north of the Oostanaula River.
Resaca National Marker Site, 12.6 miles
south of Dalton, and north of Resaca, on United
States Highway 41, was a short distance inside the
Confederate fortifications which encircled the
town. The bronze relief map mounted at this
Atlanta-Chattanooga Highway looking south toward AIill Creek
Gap in Rocky Face Ridge. Wartime photograph. {Signal Corps,
U. S. Army.)
site illustrates the important troop movements
which resulted in the Confederate withdrawal.
A road north of the marker site runs east to the
cemetery where the Confederate dead were in-
terred.
CASSVILLE
Retiring south from Resaca, the Confederates
on May 17 halted 3.5 miles north of Adairsville
and sought a strong defensive position from which
they could offer battle. Finding no terrain strong
enough for a stand against the numerically superior
Federal Army, the Confederates withdrew to
Cassville. As Sherman followed, a portion of his
troops marched directly toward Cassville, while
other columns were sent through Kingston.
Johnston thought this presented an opportunity
to destroy an isolated Federal column. His attack,
executed on May 19, failed, however, chiefly
because the Federal columns were within support-
ing distance of each other.
The Confederates then withdrew to a curving
ridge east and south of Cassville. But certain of
Johnston's corps commanders felt that the Con-
federates here were too exposed to artillery fire.
Johnston therefore withdrew on the night of May
19, taking up a position on a range just south of
Cartersville and the Etowah River.
Cassville National Marker Site is situated
.'xms&ucjmUt^
3-*
This reproduction of a wartime sketch by Theodore R. Davis in
Harper's Weekly for June 11, 1864, illustrates the position
of Osterhaus' division of the Federal Army on Bald Hill at Resaca
and the shelling oj the railroad bridge across the Oostanaula River.
1 mile south of Cassville, on United States Highway
41, and east of the ridge on which the Confederates
intrenched on May 19. The fortifications on the
ridge are well preserved. The relief map on the
site indicates troop positions and movements which
culminated in the Confederate withdrawal.
NEW HOPE CHURCH
As A YOUNG OFFICER, Sherman had traveled over
the Allatoona Pass and remembered it as a for-
midable defensive position, so again he decided
to use flanking tactics. His intention was to move
on Atlanta, and on May 23, his entire army left
the line of the railroad and moved to the southwest.
The country was almost in a state of nature, with
few or no roads. Johnston soon comprehended
the meaning of this move and sent his troops toward
New Hope Church, 4 miles north of Dallas, from
which several roads radiated toward Atlanta.
Arriving here on May 25, he assumed a position
A line oj Federal skirmishers advancing toward Resaca. This un-
usual sketch illustrates clearly the manner in which skirmishers
ordinarily advanced ahead oj the main body and is typical oj many
actions in Georgia during the Atlanta Campaign. Wartime sketch
by Theodore R Flavin in Harper's Weekly, June 11, 1864.
protecting the vital roads. Late that afternoon a
portion of the Federal Army appeared and made
a series of desperate but unsuccessful assaults.
Now that the railroad had been abandoned, the
problem of feeding the Federal troops was a major
one, for supplies had to be hauled by wagon from
the Western and Atlantic Railroad over narrow
dirt roads which heavy rainfalls had converted into
quagmires. Having flanked the Confederates from
their position at Allatoona, Sherman now deter-
mined to move back to the railroad in order to
reestablish a dependable line of supplies. Despite
Confederate vigilance, superior man power en-
abled Sherman to reach the railroad. By June 6
he had concentrated his troops in the vicinity of
Acworth, 12 miles north of Marietta.
New Hope Church National Marker Site is
located on Georgia State Highway 92, 13 miles
southwest of Acworth, at the important road
junction for which both armies were contending.
The relief map mounted at this point delineates
the troop movements which resulted in the Federal
flank movement around the Confederate Army to
the Western and Atlantic Railroad at Acworth.
Portions of the Confederate fortifications are
visible west of the marker site. North of the
marker site is New Hope Church Cemetery. The
original church which stood here during the battle
has been replaced. New Hope Church is 17 miles
west of Marietta on State Highway 120.
8
Reproduction of a section of the Cyclorama painting of the Battle of
Atlanta illustrating the desperate nature of the fighting in vicinity of
that city. Courtesy: Department of Parks, Atlanta. (Reeves
Studio Photo.)
BATTLE OF KENNESAW MOUNTAIN
When Sherman moved from New Hope Church,
Johnston was compelled to follow on a parallel line.
This shift put the Confederates in front of Mari-
etta, in a battle line extending from Lost Mountain
across Kennesaw Mountain to Brush Mountain, a
distance of about 12 miles. Pine Mountain, an
isolated eminence in front of this line, also was
occupied. This position covered Marietta, the
Western and Atlantic Railroad, which at this
point passed between Kennesaw and Brush
Mountains, and the bridges across the Chatta-
hoochee River which would be indispensable if the
Confederates were compelled to withdraw. Pro-
ceeding east from New Hope Church, Lost Moun-
tain is approximately 7}^ miles, Kennesaw Moun-
tain 14 miles, and Brush Mountain 17 miles distant.
Several days of rainy weather checked military
operations. By June 14, however, a portion of the
Federal Army had worked close to the Confederates
on Pine Mountain. Generals Johnston, Hardee,
and Polk rode to the summit of Pine Mountain
that day to observe the enemy's line, and while
there a battery of Federal guns, three-quarters of a
mile distant, fired, one of the shots killing Polk
instantly. The Confederate line of 10 miles or
more was too long for the number of available
troops, and Johnston soon concentrated them on
Kennesaw Mountain.
The main Federal force now advanced toward
Kennesaw Mountain, and as the Confederate posi-
tion was neared, Sherman's men spread out on a
line paralleling it and extending south. There was
continuous skirmishing, but the operations were
hindered by heavy rains which converted streams
into torrents and roads into ribbons of mud.
Discerning that the Federals were attempting to
envelop his flank by the movement to the south,
Johnston moved Hood from the right to the left of
his line in an effort to strike the Federals as they
maneuvered for position. On the morning of
June 22, Federal troops advanced toward Marietta
along the Powder Springs Road. By noon they
had reached the intersection of the Macland and
Powder Springs Roads, situated on a ridge which
offered a strong defensive position.
This interesting wartime photograph was taken Jrom Conjederale
trenches clearly seen in joreground and right background, looking
toward the little town of Resaca, Ga. Here are seen the road leading
south into the town, to the left the Western and Atlantic Railroad,
and beyond the town the railroad bridge over the Oostanaula River.
(Signal Corps, U. S. Army.)
The Federal troops were massed in the woods
around the road intersection, only a portion of
them intrenching. During the morning, Hood had
concentrated his troops on the Powder Springs
Road, and in the afternoon they were ordered to
attack. From Confederate prisoners it had been
learned that such a movement was intended, and
the Federals had a little time to prepare for the
assault. It began at 5:30 p. m., the Federal skir-
mish line being quickly engulfed, but failed to
reach the main line owing to heavy artillery fire.
Prior to the Confederate assault. Hooker, in
command of the Federal column, established his
headquarters in the home of Valentine Kolb,
which stands on the Powder Springs Road, 4.5
miles southwest of Marietta. Many of the fortifi-
cations erected during this engagement are also
still in existence.
Indecisive skirmishing continued for several days.
Sherman had the choice of making a frontal
assault, or attempting another turning movement.
The heavy rains and the all but impassable roads
would make the turning movement especially
difficult. Furthermore, the troops were tired of
marching and wanted to fight. Lincoln, running
for reelection, needed a Federal victory to bolster
his policy of continuing the war. If the frontal
assault succeeded, all military resistance in north
Georgia might be ended; if it failed, the flanking
movement still could be attempted. These con-
siderations determined Sherman to risk a frontal
attack.
The assault was made at two separate points
against the Confederate center on the morning of
June 27. One column struck south of Kennesaw
Mountain along the Burnt Hickory Road. An-
other was hurled against a salient south of the
Dallas Road, defended by General Cheatham, and
known now as Cheatham's Hill. Eight thousand
troops were sent against the Confederates at
Cheatham's Hill, and 5,500 at the point south of
Kennesaw Mountain. At Cheatham's Hill the
Federals lost 1,580 men in killed, wounded, and
captured, against slightly over 200 in Confederate
losses; in the attack south of Kennesaw Mountain,
the Federals lost about 600 men, including 30
officers, against about half that number of Con-
federates. The attack thus failed with heavy losses.
Military critics charge Sherman with having made
one of his few mistakes in ordering the frontal
attack.
Realizing that the Confederate position could be
carried only by a tremendous sacrifice of men,
Sherman resumed the flanking tactics which he had
employed so often. A Federal column was ex-
lO
tended far beyond the Confederate left, and
Johnston's Une of communications to Atlanta was
threatened. Consequently, on the night of July 2,
the Confederates withdrew, thus ending the Battle
of Kennesaw Mountain.
CLOSE OF THE ATLANTA CAMPAIGN
At Smyrna Station, 7 miles south of Marietta,
the Confederates took up a defensive position and
intrenched. The Federal advance and develop-
ment of this position on July 4 caused the Con-
federates again to retire and take up a fortified line
just north of the Chattahoochee River, extending
from the general vicinity of the present Bankhead
Highway to the point where United States High-
way 41 crosses the Chattahoochee River. Johnston
crossed the Chattahoochee on July 10, covered and
protected, in the words of Sherman, "by the best
line of field intrenchments I have ever seen, pre-
pared long in advance." Sherman crossed his
army over the Chattahoochee and soon faced the
Confederates behind their first line of intrench-
ments at Peach Tree Creek. At this critical mo-
ment an important event took place. On the
evening of July 17 a telegram from Richmond was
received by Johnston relieving him of command of
the Confederate Army facing Sherman in front of
Atlanta, and substituting Gen. John B. Hood, who
assumed command the following day.
Hood planned to attack at once, and on July 20,
about 1 o'clock in the afternoon, his troops left
their intrenchments and attacked the Federal
troops while they were in motion attempting a
crossing of Peach Tree Creek. Federal artillery
had been massed at a point near the present bridge
over the stream along Peach Tree Road, prepara-
tory to crossing it in the Federal advance. The
Confederate attack struck here first. The Federal
troops drawn up on the ridge along which Collier
Road in Atlanta runs today, with no trenches, met
and repulsed the attack. The fighting was des-
perate and lasted 4 hours, the troops becoming
commingled and engaging in hand to hand fighting.
In the end the Confederates were repulsed, and
they withdrew to their main fortified lines close
to Atlanta.
Sherman had determined not to assault the
intrenched Confederates, but to surround the city
and to cut all communications, which w^ould force
Hood into a general attack or compel him to
evacuate the city. In accordance with this policy,
Sherman on July 18 started General McPherson
with a portion of the Federal Army on a route to
TO ATLANTA - \l.iM
SCALE IN MILES
PARK BOUNDARY
HARD SURFACED ROADS
K.tNNESAW MOUNTAIN
NATIONAL BATTLLFILLD PAR.1^
MAR,IE.TTA- GEOR,GIA
the east of Atlanta McPherson struck the Georgia
Railroad near St6ne Mountain and then turned
toward Atlanta, tearing up the tracks as he pro-
ceeded.
Hood now tried to destroy McPherson's army'
situated in the vicinity of what are now Moreland
Avenue and Flat Shoals Road in southeastern
Atlanta. By a secret night march of 15 miles, a
portion of the Confederates under General Hardee
gained a position in the rear of McPherson. With
Wheeler's cavalry, Hardee launched an attack
about noon of July 22 that caught McPherson's
troops entirely by surprise. McPherson himself
ran directly into a column of Confederate troops
as he rode hurriedly to investigate the firing.
Wheeling his horse to escape, he was fired upon as
he entered a copse of woods. His horse emerged
riderless. McPherson's death was the greatest
single loss suff'ered by the Federal Army during the
Atlanta Campaign. In the meantime, another
Confederate force was launching an attack on the
Federal front. The Confederate attacks were not
well synchronized. That from the rear came first.
The Federals leaped over to what had been the
front side of their trenches, turned around, and
repulsed the attack. Then, as the attack in their
front developed, they leaped back to their original
position in their works and repulsed this attack.
The fighting of July 22, known as the Battle of
Atlanta, was the hardest of the campaign. Frus-
trated and defeated, the Confederates returned to
their intrenchments encircling Atlanta.
Sherman now began to shift his tioops west of
Atlanta to cut the Atlanta and West Point and the
Macon and Western (now the Central of Georgia)
Railroads. As the Federals were moving, the Con-
federates on July 28 again struck their exposed
flank near Ezra Church, where Mozley Park in
Atlanta is situated today. The attack was repulsed,
the Confederates suffering heavily.
After these three battles, fought within a week,
Sherman effectively had closed all the railroads
leading into the city except the Macon and West-
ern and the Atlanta and West Point Railroads.
He had brought by rail from Chattanooga a bat-
tery of 4K-inch rifles which easily could reach any
point in the invested city. This bombardment
forced citizens to seek refuge in cellars and caves
dug in railroad embankments. At Whitehall and
Alabama Streets in Atlanta today can be seen a
gas lamp post, now repaired, which was shattered
by an exploding shell.
Most of the month of August was spent without
decisive result. Sherman dispatched his cavalry in
an attempt to destroy the last railroad into the
city. These efforts failed. "I now became satis-
fied," Sherman writes, "that cavalry could not, or
would not, make a sufficient lodgment on the rail-
road below Atlanta, and that nothing would suffice
but for us to reach it with the main army." This
movement was begun August 25, with Jonesboro,
Federal trenches jacing Little Kennesaw Mountain. Note period
rail fence and farmhouse construction illustrated by this picture.
Wartime photograph. {Signal Corps, U. S. Army.)
^%^«
Public square of Marietta, Ga., at the time of the passage of
Sherman's army through the town shortly after the withdrawal south-
ward of the Confederates, following the battles around Kennesaw
Mountain. Wartime sketch by Theodore R. Davis in Harper's
Weekly, August 6, 1864.
20 miles south of Atlanta (United States Highway
41), the objective. Sherman knew that with the
capture of this town on the Macon and Western
Railroad, Hood would be cut off from his base of
supplies and the city of Atlanta would have to be
evacuated. In the engagements that ensued
around Jonesboro on August 31 and September 1,
the Federal Army made a secure lodgment on the
railroad and the fate of Atlanta was decided.
Hood evacuated Atlanta on September 1, and a
portion of Sherman's army occupied the city the
following day. The Confederate Army moved
from Atlanta to Lovejoy Station, where it halted,
prevented from taking any further immediate ac-
tion by the necessity of covering Andersonville, 90
miles south, where 34,000 Federal prisoners were
held in the largest of the Confederate prison camps.
The Atlanta Campaign was at an end. Before
long, preparations were under way for the move-
ment which was to take the Federal Army from
Atlanta to Savannah, the March to the Sea.
The success of the Atlanta Campaign, and of the
Portion of Sherman's army destroying the Macon Railroad between
Rough and Ready and Jonesboro, Ga. This was the last railroad
left entering Atlanta, and its destruction forced the Confederates
under General Hood to evacuate the city. Wartime sketch from
Harper's Weekly /or October 1, 1864.
events in the lower South which subsequently
derived from it, made the collapse of the Confed-
eracy almost inevitable, the exact date depending
upon the success of Grant's operations against Lee
in Virginia.
ANDREWS' RAID
While not part of the Atlanta Campaign, An-
drews' Raid may be mentioned here briefly because
of its relation to the section of the country identi-
fied with the Atlanta Campaign and because of its
considerable historic interest.
The first contact of North Georgia with the reali-
ties of the War between the States occurred in
April 1862. J. J. Andrews, a citizen of Kentucky,
together with 21 Federal soldiers, all in civilian
dress, penetrated Confederate territory and on the
night of April 11 they reached Marietta, Ga.,
where they spent the night at the Kennesaw
House, now the Marietta Hotel. This group
planned to capture a train on the Western and
Atlantic Railroad and to destroy the railroad
bridges between Chattanooga and Atlanta, so
that Federal forces approaching Huntsville, Ala.,
could rapidly march into and capture Chatta-
nooga, thus paralyzing communications in a large
portion of the Confederacy. In the spring of 1862,
Chattanooga was not heavily garrisoned, and this
plan, although daring, had a chance of success.
On the morning of April 12, 1862, the raiders
boarded a passenger train at Marietta, Ga., and
when the train stopped at Big Shanty, or Kenne-
saw, so that passengers and crew could obtain
breakfast, they stealthily uncoupled the locomotive
and three box cars from the remainder of the train
and rapidly proceeded northward.
The conductor of the stolen engine and another
railroad employee set out on foot after the fleeing
engine. Soon they found a small flat car pro-
pelled by poles, which they appropriated for the
chase. At the Etowah River the two found a
locomotive, the Yonah, and took along a number
of Confederate soldiers to aid in the pursuit.
Arriving at Kingston, a railroad junction, several
trains were found blocking the progress of the
Yonah., The conductor, in order to expedite the
pursuit, abandoned the Yonah, ran around the
trains which were blocking the way, and com-
mandeered the William R. Smith, a Rome Rail-
road locomotive, standing on a siding. With this
locomotive, the pursuit was continued, but 4 miles
north, a break in the rails brought it to a halt.
Afoot again, a run of nearly 2 miles brought two
of the pursuers in sight of the locomotive Texas,
headed southward. This engine was halted and
backed to Adairsville, where its string of freight
cars was disconnected, and in reverse, the Texas
took up the pursuit.
Illustrating the method used by Sherman in destroying railroad
materials. After tearing up the rails and cross tie timbers, the latter
were thrown together Jor bonfires, the rails being so placed over the
piles of ties that they were heated red hot during the burning of the
ties. Then the rails were twisted around trees and posts to render
them useless. Wartime photograph. {Signal Corps, U. S. Army.)
So closely did the Confederates follow that An-
drews and his men had no time to replenish fuel
and water or to burn the bridges as they had
planned. At times the locomotives reached a
speed of 60 miles an hour. After a race of about
100 miles, at a point north of Ringgold, Ga., the
captured locomotive, the General, began to lose
speed as fuel and water were almost exhausted.
Reversing the General in an effort to wreck the
Texas, the Federal soldiers abandoned the train
and dashed into the woods. Most of the party
were captured, and subsequently Andrews and 7
of his raiders were executed. A monument has
been erected at Big Shanty, or Kennesaw, where the
raid began. The raiders who were executed are
interred in the Chattanooga National Cemetery,
where a marble shaft surmounted by a bronze
replica of the General marks the group of graves.
Two of the locomotives which participated in the
Andrews' Raid incident are still in existence.
The General is the property of the State of Geor-
gia and is on exhibition in the Union Depot,
Chattanooga, Tenn. The Texas is owned by the
city of Atlanta, and may be seen in the Cyclorama
building in Grant Park in that city. Part of a
third locomotive which participated in the raid,
the WUliam R. Smith, is on the grounds of the
William R. Smith Machine Co. in Birmingham,
Ala. The boiler and its attachments have been
preserved; the trucks, cab, and tender are missing.
Chickamauga and Chattanooga
National Military Park
The history of this park is closely associated
with the Atlanta Campaign, inasmuch as Chatta-
nooga commanded the approach to the Lower
South from the west, and its possession by the
Federal Army made the campaign possible. In
a literal sense it may be said the Atlanta Cam-
paign began with the struggle for Chattanooga.
The Chickamauga and Chattanooga National
Military Park, at Chattanooga, Tenn., was estab-
lished in 1890. It is one of the oldest and largest
of the battlefield parks, embracing approximately
8,500 acres.
The various units of Chickamauga and Chat-
tanooga National Military Park, including the
battlefields of Chickamauga, Lookout Mountain,
and Missionary Ridge, are all situated on the out-
skirts of Chattanooga and are readily accessible
from that city. The top of Lookout Mountain
affords the best general view of the battlefields
around Chattanooga. Here is situated the Adolph
S. Ochs Memorial Museum and Observatory.
An attendant is on duty there to assist the visitor.
In addition to the historical interest, there are few
views in the country more arresting than that from
the top of Lookout Mountain. From this point
may be seen the great Moccasin Bend of the
Tennessee River and picturesque rugged scenery
reaching away to the far-off blue haze of the
Cumberland Mountains.
The park administration building is situated
near the northern entrance to the Chickamauga
battlefield, and here a library, museum, and special
services are available to the visitor.
The Atlanta Campaign National
Marker Sites
By legislation enacted in 1937, Congress directed
that the route of march of the Confederate and
Federal forces engaged in the Atlanta Campaign
should be ascertained and marked. Five sites,
Ringgold Gap, Rocky Face Ridge, Resaca, Cass-
ville, and New Hope Chutch, were designated for
special marker treatment.
Small tracts of land have been acquired at ap-
propriate locations at each of the sites through the
efforts of public spirited citizens of the State of
Georgia, and here parking areas and overlook
developments have been provided. At each place
a bronze national historic site marker has been
erected. Also, bronze marker tablets illustrating
and interpreting the main movements of the
armies in the vicinity of each of the sites have been
incorporated in the overlook developments. The
Work Projects Administration of the State of
Georgia cooperated in completing the work at the
several sites. The national marker sites at Ring-
gold Gap, Rocky Face Ridge, Resaca, and
Cassville are immediately adjacent to United
States Highway 41, the main traveled road
between Chattanooga and Atlanta. The New
Hope Church national marker site is situated on
Georgia State Highway 92, 13 miles southwest of
Acworth. It can be reached also by proceeding
17 miles west from Marietta on Georgia State
Highway 120.
Kennesaw Mountain National
Battlefield Park
Kennesaw Mountain National Battlefikld
Park has been administered by the National Park
Service since 1933. As a result of congressional
action in 1935 and 1939 the battlefield park has
grown from a small reservation of 60 acres at
Cheatham's Hill, acquired by a group of Union
soldiers in 1899, to a battlefield area of about
3,000 acres, including the principal points of com-
bat, on most of which the fortifications constructed
during the battle are well preserved.
The park administration building is situated
2 miles north of Marietta at the point where
United States Highway 41 passes the northern
tip of Kennesaw Mountain. A collection of maps,
photographs, and relics in the administration
building are helpful to the visitor in interpreting
the Atlanta Campaign. Here library facilities
and guide services are available to the public.
Organizations or groups will be given special
services if arrangements are made in advance with
the superintendent. Communications concerning
the park should be directed to the Superintendent,
Kennesaw Mountain National Battlefield Park,
Marietta, Ga.
15
UNIVERSITY C
MGIA LIBRARIES
U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1942
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